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REMARKS O N  P HILOSOPHY AND THE CURRICULUM 
by 
John D. Wilson 
lf our schools and colleges are in difficulty today it may be in large measure 
because no ,one any longer understands why we teach what we do. This is an 
exaggeraLion, or course, but it is made in order to register the fact that it is not 
simply students who question the shape and character of the curriculum. Faculties 
too have suffered the appalling experience of discovering that they as well do not 
know what they are about, collectively, and thus are powerless to respond to the 
questions implicitly or explicitly directed to them. One result (thus far) has been an 
enormous infatuation with the idea of change. No serious statement about 
American education today can avoid the rhetoric of drastic curriculum reform. 
But change need not be a bad thing, especially if it mandates self-examination at 
the most fundamental level. If the new pedantry is required to stare at itself in a 
mirror, we might well be delivered from cbe undernourishing diistortions of liberal 
learning which are now so prevalent in our colleges and universities . . .  and thus, at 
some remove. in our secondary schools. Our schools and colleges need nothing so 
much as they need faculties wbo know the difference between liberal learning and 
its many mockeries and who have the self-confidence to explain that difference to 
their students and to interested others. 
Curriculum rationaHzation is, of course, an old problem which takes on new 
forms for each generation. The value of the liberal arts and sciences, properly 
conceived, should . . . no. must be rediscovered by each of us. No curriculum can 
hope to survive in any vital way if it relies only upon habit or tradition for its 
justification. 
Il is to this important problem that Professor Scheffler speaks when he considers 
how general philosophy miight be made to contribute more than it now does to the 
education of teachers. He would deny this large claim, no doubt, !or his paper is 
circumspectly limited to a consideration of how the traditional components of a 
teacher-training program might be usefully modified to include work in the 
philosophy of the discipline to be Laught. And this represents a modest enough 
suggestion, one we can scarcely deny, for what could be more important to tbe 
teacher of history or science than that he leave the lecture room or the laboratory 
long enough to take up analytically che essential character of his discipline - that 
be may be made to think of history or science in epistemological terms, that be 
consider the form of knowledge it represents and come to some understanding of 
the w.!y it is organized and what claims it can make upon truth. Professor Scheffler 
argues that the prospective teacher may never directly introduce speculation of this 
sort in his own classroom. but that he cannot possibly develop a classroom strategy. 
a syllabus informed by the intention to convey a specific set of mental habits, unless 
he has engaged in such speculation before he enters the classroom. If this be 
granted, the argument runs. then it is preferable that the speculation be systematic, 
that it be subject to philosophical criticism, that it be informed by the considerable 
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philosophical lireramre so immediately accessible bu1 so rarely used (or 
disco,·ered) by 1be prospecrive teacher. 
I am persuaded that the 'philosophy of' approach could be enormously helpful to 
1he future teacher as he prepares to enter his first classroom ; indeed, it could be 
considered an indispensable prerequisite to his consideralion of teaching melbods. 
But I would go further still to argue tha1 systematic experience with the lirerature of 
'philosophy of,' in spite of its eclectic character. will contribute more to the 
development of a self-confident teacher of the liberal ans and sciences than almost 
anything in his preparation. Indeed, it is precisely this pervasive lack in our school 
and college faculties which accounts for the flatulent waffling we hear when the 
'relevance' question is raised. If  the teacher of history cannot describe the shape of 
his discipline, cannot articulate how it organizes and verifies knowledge and what 
its range of pretension is and how this differs from, say, the scientific disciplines, 
then he cannot reach history in any inclusive sense. Moreover he cannot 
rationalize, either in !faculty meetings or wi(h his students in class or outside, why it 
is important that history be an integral part of the curriculum. Not only will be be 
unable to speak well of the uses of the past. but he will be powerless before the 
simplest questioning of the concept of 'historical truth.' And thus he will not truly 
fulfill his responsibility co his students or to the community. 
There is in my affinnation of Professor ScheHler's argument. then, an assumption 
that may need further examination. lt is that not only will a more thoughtful, self­
conrident teacher of history be assured by exposure to 'philosophy of history' but 
that 1his exposure wilJ also insure a more thoughtful generalist on the faculty, that 
is, a person who wiU be better equipped to contribute to the overall development of 
the school or college curriculum. To be sure, Professor Scheffler hasn't argued chis 
far. Nonetheless I think it likely, and I think so in spite of uhe fact that the provision 
of 'philosophy of' experiences in teacher 1training programs may well be po�ible 
only at che expense of experiences of a broader kind, i.e. work in fields other than 
the teaching discipline or work in craditional philosophy of education. What I am 
suggesting is that systematic and thoughtful examination of a school or college 
curriculum must be taken up by teachers who are accustomed to the rules 
governing inquiry of this sort, who know the 1erms appropriate to it and who are 
prepared to communicate with each other in those terms. I am certain, for 
example, that serious reading in the philosophy of history, even if that reading does 
not develop an explicit comparative frame, will equip the history 1eacher to discuss 
responsibly with his colleagues the value of social science field work or the wisdom 
of admitting area studies of one sort or another into the curriculum or whether or 
not algebra should be introduced in 1he 7th grade. And �o with the other 
"philosophies of: 1 urge this extension of the argument only because it seems to me 
"alid. and if so. musil. be reckoned amongst the most conspicuously ab.sent of the 
qualities of mind our schools now so clearly need. 
Ha' ing established my agreement with Professor Scheffler's argument (indeed, 
having extended it). I must also, to satisfy my charge, raise questions about its 
implementation. To brief, how can our colleges accommodate it? Who will teach 
philosophy of' and at the expense of what? 
These are not. I hope, examples of the usual administrative stalling when con-
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fronted with ao idea. I think they are important questions directed as much at the 
character of the graduate preparation of our collegiate faculties as at the registrar's 
time-schedule. For example, can we trust this instruction to our science depart­
ments or to the faculties in history, literature. and so on'! Or must we ask the 
philosophy department to provide ·philosophy of' instruction in each of the major 
disciplines'! It seems to me clear that it must be instruction provided under the 
general auspices of the philosophers, with as much participation as can be managed 
with the resident historians, scientists, literary scholars, et cetera. There are dif­
ficulties in this suggestion, not all of them political in nature. But I am led to make 
it by the contention that too few of us in collegiate departments of study have any 
sophistication at all in the philosophical literature explicating the epistemological 
ac;sumptions of our fields. We do science, we teach it by having others do it 
alongside us. but too few of us think about it in any rigorous or systematic way. 
There are other problems as well. We might be successful in persuading the 
scientist to make room for che study of the philosophy of science in teacher 
preparation programs (if he need only be minimaJly involved) but what about the 
literary scholars or critics? In literature the problem of eclecticism is especially 
hard to overcome. And even if one manages to accommodate the lack of a unified 
theory of literature with settled modes of thought. can we persuade the literary 
scholar that general principles. however derived or verified. are as important as the 
idiosyncrat ic work of literary art? He will argue that Lear is our first obligation. not 
as an exemplification of a form of chought or of a theory of tragedy or anything else 
beyond its own uniquely powerful testament. Thus. curriculum strategy wi ll likely 
get into trouble with the literary scholar if it asks him to discuss how it is possible to 
speak of literature as a 'way of knowing' or to discuss a literary artifact as an 
exemplum of a systematic way of organizing a certain kind of knowledge. He will 
permit a senior course in criticism or a graduate seminar in the theory of literature, 
but he will argue strenuously that his main obligation to his undergraduate 
students, including his prospective teachers, is to enlarge their direct experience of 
gn�at works of literary art and to extend their capacity to respond sensitively to 
them. 
There may be similar problems in the other relevant disci plines. The historian 
has long been friendly to the philosophlcal analysis of his discipline but customarily 
has been reluctant to take it up before a student has become "serious," i.e. before 
his advanced graduate work designates him as one who wishes to become an 
historian rather than a teacher of history. In brief. the historian sees 'philosophy of' 
as vitally important to the doing or writing of history (unlike the scientist) rather 
than to the teaching of history in the classroom. Whether he can be made to see its 
general application and welcome it into his program for secondary teachers 
remains to be seen. 
ln anticipating these caveats, I may well be reflecting still another - the 
reluctance to concede that most students interested in secondary teaching will have 
the speculative capacity to move from the 'materials' of their subject - not in the 
direction of application to their anticipated classroom problems - but in the more 
austere and abstract direction of considering where in the intellectual landscape 
their subject is located and what its conceptual framework is like. It is true, I think, 
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that not aJJ of us are equipped for work of this kind, eithe:r as students or teachers, 
and the spectacle of huge universicy lecture balls filled with reluctant 'philosophers 
of' is not especially reassuring. But in what would their reluctancy reside? In the 
assumption that teaching photosynthesis in a laboratory or the importance of the 
Elizabethan compromise will not require an understanding of philosophy of science 
or phi losophy of bistory -i.e., that these last are not immediately relevant to their 
practical problems as prospective teachers. 
I believe with Professor Scheffler that they are wrong in this assumption and I 
believe it would be relatively easy to dissuade them of it. But clearly it would be 
necessary to do so in the first instance. And, I might add, it would be enormously 
helpful to have on hand, when the attempt were made, a teacher-scholar with 
Professor Scheffler's gifts. 
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